Magyar Szerzői Jogi Fórum Egyesület ankét április 17 „ALKOTMÁNYOS”, ELJÁRÁSJOGI ÉS TARTALMI PROBLÉMÁK A CJEU SZERZŐI JOGI GYAKORLATÁBAN Id. dr. Ficsor Mihály

Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 172 BEVEZETŐ

Költői „disclaimer” Érted haragszom én, nem ellened, nosza szorítsd meg a kezem, mellyel magosra tartalak álmaimban, erősítsen az én haragom, dehogy is bántson, kedves. (József Attila) Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 173

Magyarázat a kétnyelvűségre Egyes EU-s dokumentumoknak – főleg az Európai Unió Bírósága ítéleteinek – a magyar fordítása eléggé zavaros és terminológiai pontatlanságokkal terhes. Erre is tekintettel, ott ahol voltak a témába vágó powerpoint előadásaim a közelmúltban, azoknak a megfelelő részét illesztettem be. Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 174

5 „ALKOTMÁNYOS” PROBLÉMÁK - POLITIKUSI VÉLEMÉNY

Martin Schulz óv egy „Frankenstein Európától” (1) Népszabadság Online tudósítás, március 12: A frappáns kijelentéseiről ismert Martin Schulz gyakorlatilag antidemokratikusnak minősítette az Európai Uniót egy hamburgi kerekasztal-beszélgetésen. Ezzel érvelt: „Európában a nemzeti szuverenitás a hatalmi ágak szétválasztásán alapul: van egy kormány, amelyet a parlament leszavazhat, valamint egy független igazságszolgáltatási rendszer, amely a szabályok betartását felügyeli.” S innen jutott el a szörnyetegig: „Most pedig ennek a keretnek egyes részeit átruházzuk az EU szintjére, anélkül azonban, hogy a hatalmi ágak szétválasztását is átruháznánk. Ezt az eredményt hívom én Frankenstein-Európának” – idézte az EUobserver hírportál a német politikust, aki mindjárt a következtetést is levonta: a polgárok így nem bízhatnak az unióban. Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 176

Martin Schulz óv egy „Frankenstein Európától” (2) Népszabadság Online tudósítás, március 12 (folytatás) Van benne valami – ez a legkevesebb, amit Martin Schulz sommás összefoglalójáról mondhatunk. „Bizonyos történések… elidegenítik az embereket. Két irányzat létezik…: az egyik nem nyugszik, amíg nem privatizálják az utolsó helyi temetőt is. A másik pedig csak akkor elégedett, ha EU-szabályozást dolgoznak ki a temetésekre is.” ( Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 177

8 ALKOTMÁNYOS PROBLÉMÁK – JOGIRODALMI ÁTTEKINTÉS (részlet egy 2013-as Fordham előadásból)

21st Annual Intellectual Property Law & Policy Conference Fordham University School of Law April 4-5, 2013 Panel 3A. EU Copyright: Recent Developments THE INUNDATION OF THE CJEU BY COPYRIGHT REFERRALS AND THE DANGERS OF „CREEPING HARMONIZATION” Dr. Mihály Ficsor, Member and Honorary President, Hungarian Copyright Council, former Assistant Director General of WIPO

Harmonization by stealth – creeping harmonization Synonyms; in fact „harmonization by stealth” may better describe the nature of the phenomenon. At the 2012 Fordham IP Conference, Lionel Bentley presented a paper under the title „Harmonization by Stealth: Copyright and the ECJ” analyzing CJEU case law and referring to certain advantageous and disadvantageous aspects of such kind of harmonization. Why to address the issue again:  apparent acceleration and broadening of the phenomenon;  need to study further and, in certain aspects more in detail, those potential problems to which L. Bentley referred last year. Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 1710

Advantages and disadvantages as seen by L. Bently In his last year presentation, L. Bentley summed up advantages and disadvantages of „harmonization by stealth” through preliminary rulings He saw as advantages: (i) legitimate outcomes, and (ii) overcoming political sensitivities (as discussed below, this may only be regarded as an advantage it does not also involve „overcoming” the limits of harmonization determined by the TFEU). He listed as disadvantages: (i) process legitimacy between EU and the Member States; (ii) process legitimacy between legislative and judicial functions; and (iii) „transitional uncertainty” (deriving from the newly clarified legal situation by the CJEU in Member States). At the beginning of his presentation, he also stated that the CJEU’s „case- law-extending harmonization goes beyond what was agreed” (necessarily among the Member States). This may be regarded a reference to the above-mentioned „process legitimacy” problems from another angle. Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 1711

With due respect to the CJEU – reviewing disadvantages and potential problems This presentation is intended mainly for a review, more in detail, of the disadvantages of the actual application of the rules on preliminary rulings referred to by L. Bently and identified by others, as well as other potential problems also discussed in legal literature. This, however, goes along with due respect to the judicial status of the CJEU and its important achievements in certain cases where authoritative interpretation of the EU law was truly needed and useful guidance was offered; just some examples:  Promusicae in which the Court offered a GPS how to navigate at the crossroads of several – not necessarily harmonious – directives (but still Bonnier followed);  Infopaq in which guidance was needed due to the gaps in the aquis since the directives had established a (correct) originality standard only for three categories (but just a general orientation might have been enough like in Feist in the US); or  L’Oréal discussed below (but then, unfortunately Netlog came as also discussed below). Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 1712

Rich legal literature relevant for evaluating the practice and impact of preliminary rulings (1) Some examples: Karen J. Alter: „Who are the ‚Masters of the Treaty’?: European Governments and the European Court of Justice” referred to by L. Bently last year (in International Organization 54 (2000)). The author of the thorough study points out that the CJEU’s current status reflects significant unintended changes in the EU and national systems by transforming the preliminary ruling system from a mechanism to allow to challenge EC law in national courts into a mechanism to allow individual to challenge national law in national courts (and then at the CJEU) – to which the Court’s activism contributed by developing the principles of „direct effect” and „EC/EU law supremacy” avoiding, in this way, Member State control. Although Member States, or at least many of them, may not like this unintended development, now that the system is established, due to the complex co-decision process, it would be very difficult to change it. Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 1713

Rich legal literature relevant for evaluating the practice and impact of preliminary rulings (2) Thomas Horsley: „Subsidiarity and the European Court of Justice: Missing Pieces in the Subsidiarity Jigshaw,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 2011, pp The article reviews the evolution of subsidiarity as a constitutional principle within the case law of the CJEU. It argues that, to date, discussion of subsidiarity as a judicial principle remains too narrowly focused on its impact as a restraint on the Union legislature. It proves in a persuasive manner that the Court, as an EU institution should respect subsidiarity (as well as the principle of proportionality) also as a brake on its own interpretative functions. Thereafter, it reviews the Court’s interpretation of the Treaty’s free movement provisions applying this clarification with particular attention to Tobacco Advertising, pointing out that Article 114 of TFEU does not justify reviewing and overruling national legislation solely on the basis of abstract effect on intra-EU movement without sufficient transnational effect. Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 1714

Rich legal literature relevant for evaluating the practice and impact of preliminary rulings (3) Mirelle van Eechoud: „Along the Road to Uniformity – Diverse Readings of the Court of Justice Judgments on Copyright Work, JIPITEC, 2012, pp In the conclusion part of the paper, the author notes, inter alia, as follows: „The preliminary reference tool takes on a new meaning. The numbers of copyright cases brought before the Court of Justice are rising, and the Court shows itself rather activist and willing to construct pan-European notions of copyright that are not clearly in (or even squarely out of) the directives.” By this statement and by what is implied in the title of the article, reference is made at least to four problems in connection with the preliminary ruling system the way it functions: (i) the CJEU is inundated by ever more cases, (ii) as a collateral effect, it takes over ever more functions – sometimes unnecessary and in an unjustified manner – from national courts ; (iii) by promoting uniformity, it may get into conflict with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; (iv) conflicts may emerge also Montesquieu’s still valid principle of separation of powers (duly recognized by the TFEU which does not grant legislative function to the CJEU). Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 1715

Rich legal literature relevant for evaluating the practice and impact of preliminary rulings (4) Jan Komárek: „In the Court(s) We Trust? – On the need for hierarchy and differentiation in the preliminary ruling procedure” Unfortunately, what the author states in the conclusion of the article does not seem to be unfounded: „The article believes that the fundamental Court of Justice’s task, when ensuring that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed,… is to provide national courts with authoritative guidance. However, to be able to speak with authority, the Court must speak clearly and persuasively. This cannot be done if it pulverizes its authority into hundreds of (sometimes) contradictory and (often) insufficiently reasoned answers. The current system of preliminary reference, which undermines national judicial structures by allowing the lowest parts of the judicial pyramid to talk directly to the ultimate interpretative authority, has negative effects both for the national judicial process and for the Court of Justice’s mission.” (Emphasis added.) Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 1716

Summary of actual and potential problems of the preliminary ruling system CJEU activism may lead to even more serious – quasi constitutional – problems: It may result in conflicts with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; By unduly undertaking de facto legislative functions, conflicts may emerge also with the principle of separation of powers. Such kind of potential disrespect of certain principles the protection of which is the Court’s task may weaken its credibility and respect towards it. Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 1717

Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr USEDSOFT – PÉLDA A HATÁLYOS JOG BÍRÓSÁGI „MÓDOSÍTÁSÁRA” (részlet a évi ALAI kongresszuson tartott előadásból)

ALAI Congress in honor of José María Torres Caicedo Dissemination and Management of Works of Authorship on the Internet Cartagena, September 16 to 18, 2013 RELEVANCE OF EXHAUSTION OF RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT? Dr. Mihály Ficsor, Honorary President, Hungarian ALAI Group

The Court of Justice of the EU in UsedSoft (1) In UsedSoft v. Oracle, the subject matter of the dispute was Oracle’s programs covered by an end-user license agreement (EULA). The EULA contained a term forbidding the licensee to transfer the computer program to a third party. UsedSoft, a company based in Germany, allowing its costumers to “resell” through its online system, programs covered by the licenses. The CJEU in its ruling held that the exhaustion of the right of distribution is also applicable for copies of computer programs made through online transmissions (CJEU case C-128/11). The CJEU erred for several reasons and adopted new law by practically amending the existing EU norms (to which its competence does not extend under the EU Treaty). M. Ficsor, Cartagena ALAI Congress20

The Court of Justice of the EU in UsedSoft (2) As it discussed in previous slides on the provisions of the WCT and the WPPT, those Treaties only provide for the possibility of limiting the exclusive right of distribution by exhaustion with the first sale of copies if tangible copies are involved. The Treaties do not include similar possibility in respect of copies made through online transmission in a way that the holder of the copy, or anybody else on his behalf, would be allowed to make a new copy from transmission. The Information Society (Copyright) Directive has implemented correctly the two WIPO Treaties in respect of all categories of works – including computer programs to which all the provisions of the Treaties apply including those which are relevant from the viewpoint of the right of distribution and the possibility of limiting it by exhaustion. M. Ficsor, Cartagena ALAI Congress21

The Court of Justice of the EU in UsedSoft (3) The CJEU has quoted Recital (29) and Article 3(3) of the Information Society (Copyright) Directive but it has adopted a ruling which is in conflict with them: Recital (29): „The question of exhaustion does not arise in the case of services and on-line services in particular. This also applies with regard to a material copy of a work or other subject-matter made by a user of such a service with the consent of the rightholder... Unlike CD-ROM or CD-I, where the intellectual property is incorporated in a material medium, namely an item of goods, every on-line service is in fact an act which should be subject to authorisation where the copyright or related right so provides. Article 3(3): The rights referred to in paragraphs 1 (the right of reproduction) and 2 (the right of communication to the public, including making available to the public) shall not be exhausted by any act of communication to the public or making available to the public as set out in this Article. (Emphasis added.) M. Ficsor, Cartagena ALAI Congress22

The Court of Justice of the EU in UsedSoft (4) When a „used” program is uploaded to the UsedSoft system, a new copy is made which is covered by right of reproduction. The right of reproduction cannot be „exhausted” under the international treaties and the „acquis communautaire.” The acts of making copies through transmission may be characterized as „sale” or „distribution.” This is not the real issue; this is in accordance with the principle of „relative freedom of legal characterization” of acts covered by protected rights mentioned above. However, a specific legal characterization cannot change the nature and the level of protection of the rights involved (with possible limitations allowed or not allowed), in this case the right of reproduction – and of course the right of making available to the public which is also covered by the overall charcterization as „distribution.” M. Ficsor, Cartagena ALAI Congress23

The Court of Justice of the EU in UsedSoft (5) In spite of this, The CJEU ruled that the right of making available characterized by it as „distribution” and the right of reproduction in respect of making copies through online transmission is exhausted by making making a copy through transmission – an act covered by the right of making available under bot the WIPO Treaties and the Directive. This is in conflict with the international norms and the acquis communautaire. M. Ficsor, Cartagena ALAI Congress24

The Court of Justice of the EU in UsedSoft (6) The CJEU has tried to defend its ruling on the basis that the Computer Program Directive (adopted in 1991; consolidated in 2009) is lex specialis in relation to the Information Society (Copyright) Directive and that its position is based on specific provisions of the Computer Programs Directive differing from the general provisions of the Information Society (Copyright) Directive. This argument cannot stand any serious scrutiny. It is really true that, under Article 1(2) of the Information Society (Copyright) Directive, it leaves intact and no way affects the provisions of the previously adopted five copyright directives, including the Computer Programs Directive. However, this does not mean that, where there is is no specific rule (lex specialis) not the lex generalis of the Information Society (Copyright) Treaty would apply in accordance with the WIPO treaties. There is no specific provision in the Computer Programs Directive – zero – which would serve as a basis for the CJEU’ preliminary ruling. M. Ficsor, Cartagena ALAI Congress25

The Court of Justice of the EU in UsedSoft (7) In the UsedSoft case, the CJEU judges tried to play Terminators going back to the past to change it in order to transform the presence the way they wanted to see it. Arnold Schwarzenegger succeded in such a role; they have failed. M. Ficsor, Cartagena ALAI Congress26

The Court of Justice of the EU in UsedSoft (8) Let us take CJEU’s arguments about the alleged ius specialis (a parade of non sequitur inferences) Where the CJEU believes to have found a specific rule – which according to it offers appropriate basis for the exhaution of the right of making new copies through transmission (=the right of reproduction) and the right of making available within which the acts take place and characterized as distribution – is Article 5(1) of the Computer Program Directive. It reads as follows: Article 5.Exceptions to the restricted acts (emphasis added) 1. In the absence of specific contractual provisions, the acts referred to in points (a) and (b) of Article 4(1) shall not require authorisation by the rightholder where they are necessary for the use of the computer program by the lawful acquirer in accordance with its intended purpose, including for error correction. M. Ficsor, Cartagena ALAI Congress27

The Court of Justice of the EU in UsedSoft (8) Let us take CJEU’s arguments about the alleged ius specialis (a parade of non sequitur inferences) Where the CJEU believes to have found a specific rule – which according to it offers appropriate basis for the exhaution of the right of making new copies through transmission (=the right of reproduction) and the right of making available within which the acts take place and characterized as distribution – is Article 5(1) of the Computer Program Directive. It reads as follows: Article 5.Exceptions to the restricted acts (emphasis added) 1. In the absence of specific contractual provisions, the acts referred to in points (a) and (b) of Article 4(1) shall not require authorisation by the rightholder where they are necessary for the use of the computer program by the lawful acquirer in accordance with its intended purpose, including for error correction. M. Ficsor, Cartagena ALAI Congress28

The Court of Justice of the EU in UsedSoft (9) There are irrefutable reasons for which no ius specialis may be found in the Computer Programs Directive under which what follows from the InfoSoc Directive – namely that the right to authorize the making of new copies (covered by the right of reproduction) through interactive online transmission (in the case of which the right of making available is concerned) is not exhausted where the making of copies implying such rights is authorized – might not apply. Let us suppose, first, (but not accepting it at all) that Article 5(1) might apply for the act of downloading through the UsedSoft system and that the act of acquiring of a copy of a program in that way might be regarded as an act permitted for a lawful acquirer to perform since it is „necessary for the use of the computer program.” Would not the first provisio of Article 5(1) – „[i]n the absence of specific contractual provisions” – applicable in such a case. Might there be any healthy reason to allege that the owner of rights in a computer program – while allowing the use the program, e.g. just under an EULA – could not prohibit the acts mentioned in Article 5(1) by contract where the program is transferred to someone else. No; there is no such reason. M. Ficsor, Cartagena ALAI Congress29

The Court of Justice of the EU in UsedSoft (10) However, there is a second reason which makes the first one marginal as not relating to the decisive issue. Article 5(1) is about the question of what a lawful acquirer may do after having lawfully acquired a computer program. In UsedSoft, the legal issues were completely different. The issues were (i) whether or not an owner of the program may authorize somebody else to acquire a program by making a new copy through online transmission instead of the owner of rights, (ii) whether or not UsedSoft may upload a copy of the program in its system making it available for somebody else to acquire a new copy through online tranmission; (iii) whether or not under such circumstances those who download new copies of the programs are „lawful acquirers” and – otherwise – are performing an act needed to use an aquired program when they are just acquiring it. And, of course, behind these questions, there was (and is) the fundamental question whether or not the right to authorize making intangible copies through online transmission (irrespective whether it is characterized as distribution) may be exhausted as a result of the first authorized making of a copy (reproduction) through online transmission. Article 5(1) does not address these issues; the ius generalis applies as embodied in the InfoSoc Directive in accordance with the WCT. Under that law, the anwser is a clear„No” to all these questions. M. Ficsor, Cartagena ALAI Congress30

The Court of Justice of the EU in UsedSoft (11) In the CJEU ruling there are still such kinds of arguments: The preliminary ruling stresses that Article 4(2) of the Software Directive refers without further specification to the ‘sale … of a copy of a program, and „thus makes no distinction according to the tangible or intangible form of the copy in question.” This is considered lex specialis justifying the exhaustion of acts of making copies through online transmissions. However, Article 4(2) of the InfoSoc Directive also reads as follows: „sale of copies of the work” (where „work” means any work including any computer program). There is no difference. There is no obstacle whatsoever to charaterize making copies through transmission as distribution through sale. This, however, does not change the fact that exhaustion only applies to the copy first „sold” and it has nothing to do with the making another copy through online transmission. M. Ficsor, Cartagena ALAI Congress31

The Court of Justice of the EU in UsedSoft (12) After this, the CJEU simply Article 1(2) of the Software Directive which states that „[p]rotection in accordance with this Directive shall apply to the expression in any form of a computer program” and Recital 7 in the preamble to Directive specifying that the „computer programs” it aims to protect „include programs in any form, including those which are incorporated into hardware.” Immediately, after this the CJEU makes thisstatement: „Those provisions thus make abundantly clear the intention of the European Union legislature to assimilate, for the purposes of the protection laid down by Directive 2009/24, tangible and intangible copies of computer programs.” Two comments should be added to this. First, this is no new argument to support that exhaustion is not limited to the copy that has been sold and that there is no exhaustion of the right of reproduction and making available to the public when another copy is made through online transmission. Second, and more importantly, the essence of this argument is that the statement that computer programs are protected by copyright „ in any form” shows that lex specialis is involved. Only somebody who has forgotten of Article 2(1) of the Berne Convention – with the phrase „whatever may be the mode or form” – can make such a surprising statement. M. Ficsor, Cartagena ALAI Congress32

The Court of Justice of the EU in UsedSoft (13) Let us mention, however, the most stupefying statement that the CJEU inevitably has to make since without this it would be obligated to recognize what is obvious; namely that its whole sweat-smelling construction collapes at the slightest breeze of legal scrutiny. Exhaustion only applies to „that copy” which is acquired as a result of first sale. So the CJEU states: the copy which is made as a result of the transmission to the UsedSoft system and than the further copy which is made as a result of online trasmission is „that copy;” the same copy as the one which was originally made through transmission from the rightowner’s website. Let us avoid characterizing by an adjective the complete absence of any relationship of this allegation with reality and thruth. M. Ficsor, Cartagena ALAI Congress33

The Court of Justice of the EU in UsedSoft (14) There are really specific norms in the Computer Program Directive which form lex specialis, such as the provisions on decompilation of programs. However, there is no lex specialis element which would justify the exhaustion of the right of reproduction and the right of making available in case of making copies through online transmission, irrespective of what actually takes place in this respect, is characterized as „distribution.” M. Ficsor, Cartagena ALAI Congress34

The Court of Justice of the EU in UsedSoft (15) It is already not a de lege lata, but a typical de lege ferenda, argument that exhaustion may be applied since the original copy is supposed to be deleted and thus only one copy remains at the end. It is said that such making of another copy through transmission may have the same effect as transfer of the same copy. There are some legal problems with this de lege lata argument; but the practical impact on the exploitation of copyright at least as big and even bigger. Oracle pointed out what is evident; it cannot be safely controlled that when a new copy is made in the UsedSoft system and then one more by the new „buyer,” there is no other copy available on an external device. The CJEU makes a cynical remark about it pointing out the essence of which is that infringements do happen also in other cases. However, it is a big difference for the hen between two cases: when the fox should go after it if he wants to get the hen and when the hen is placed in the fox’s cage in the zoo with the inscription „you should swear you do not eat it!) M. Ficsor, Cartagena ALAI Congress35

The Court of Justice of the EU in UsedSoft (16) The CJEU has entered the field of legislation by including something in the Computer Programs Directive „retrospectively” which was not there and, through this, modifying the actual acquis as adopted in accordance with due legislative procedure by those Union bodies who truly have competence to create new norms and modify old ones. The consideration of the de lege lata arguments on which the UsedSoft ruling is based was not a matter for this judicial body. What the Parliament and the Council would do is a question. The CJEU’ excuse that it has acted in the name of the internal market is groundless. If legislative measures are needed for this it is not a matter of the Court. Hopefully the Parliament and the Council would act in accordance with the international norms binding the EU and its Member States. If they had had any intention to modify the acquis in this respect, there would have been an opportunity to do so in 2009 when the codified version of the Directive was adopted. No such idea emerged. Furthermore, it is an indication about the chances of new regulation that several governments opposed the CJEU’s position; governments which would have a say in the Council (if the Council could act in accordance with its – in its case truly existing – legislative competence). M. Ficsor, Cartagena ALAI Congress36

The Court of Justice of the EU in UsedSoft (17) One may be shrugged off this unfortunate intrusion of the CJEU into the field of legislation by saying that hopefully the cloud technology with its virtualization environment not necessitating downloading programs and other works in the end-users’ devices and/or the transformation of the contractual system may offer solutions for the owners of rights to prevent conflicts with the exploitation of their rights. However, this does not solve immediate problems. One may also say that after all, the CJEU ruling only concern computer programs not mainstream categories of works. More caution is needed in this respect. As some national reports have also pointed out, there is no guarantee that the other categories of works will not become victims of the CJEU’s „judicial activism” (which is a euphemism standing for something else that Baron Montesquieu certainly would not like to see). M. Ficsor, Cartagena ALAI Congress37

Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr GARANCIÁK TÉVES DÖNTÉSEKRE AZ EU BÍRÓSÁGI RENDSZER SZABÁLYOZÁSÁBAN

„Alkotmányos garancia” a téves jogértelmezésre– az előzetes döntéshozatali eljárás Az EU működéséről szóló szerződés (EUMSz) 267. cikke Az Európai Unió Bírósága hatáskörrel rendelkezik előzetes döntés meghozatalára a következő kérdésekben: a) a Szerződések értelmezése; b) az uniós intézmények, szervek vagy hivatalok jogi aktusainak érvényessége és értelmezése; Ha egy tagállam bírósága előtt ilyen kérdés merül fel, és ez a bíróság úgy ítéli meg, hogy ítélete meghozatalához szükség van a kérdés eldöntésére, kérheti az Európai Unió Bíróságát, hogy hozzon ebben a kérdésben döntést. Ha egy tagállam olyan bírósága előtt folyamatban lévő ügyben merül fel ilyen kérdés, amelynek határozatai ellen a nemzeti jog értelmében nincs jogorvoslati lehetőség, e bíróság köteles az Európai Unió Bíróságához fordulni. Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 1739

A jelenlegi döntéshozatali rendszer káros következményei (1) Az egészséges bírósági hierarchia lerombolása. A legalacsonyabb szintű – valószínűleg a legkevésbé képzett és az ügyben speciális szakértelemmel nem rendelkező – bíróság közvetlenül fordulhat az EU legmagasabb szintű, bíróságához (ahol a bírák ugyancsak nem szakértői az olyan részletesen szabályozott jogterületnek, mint a szerzői jog). Az Európai Unió Bírósága átveszi az első, második és harmadik igazságszolgáltatási fórum szerepét egyszerre. Az Tagországok legfelső fórumát még kötelezik is, hogy forduljon az EUB-hoz; nem merjen eldönteni semmilyen ügyet, amelyben a legparányibb kétely is felmerülhet (jóllehet van kialakított véleménye az ügyről). Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 1740

A jelenlegi döntéshozatali rendszer káros következményei (2) Az első káros következmény az, hogy az EUB-t elárasztják az előzetes döntéshozatal iránti előterjesztések. Olyan munkaterhe van, mint egy városi bíróságnak. Érdemes összehasonlítani, milyen gyakran kerülnek ügyek a legfelsőbb bírói fórum elé az EU-ban az előzetes eljárási rendszerben és az USA-ban a writ of certiorari rendszerben ban, az EUB 701 eljárást fejezett be (szemben az előző évi 595-el), s 699 új ügy került elé (ami 10%-os emelkedést jelentett 2012-höz képest). (Forrás : CJEU sajtóközlemény No. 34/14). Ezzel szemben, pl. a 2011 június 30. és 2012 július 2. közötti évben az USA Legfelsőbb Bírósága a hozzá felterjesztett 7,654 „cert” kérelemből csak 63-nak adott helyet (0.892%) (Forrás: http//dailywrit.com/2013/01/likelyhood-of-a-petition-being-granted/.) Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 1741

A jelenlegi döntéshozatali rendszer káros következményei (3) A nagy munkateher könnyen felületességhez vezet, s ennek sajnos vannak nyomai egyes EUB ítéletekben. Még nagyobb baj az, hogy egyes fontos kérdések úgy kerülnek eldöntésre, hogy nincs lehetőség az összes lehetséges jogi és egyéb érvek alapos megfontolására, ami egy normális bírósági hierarchiában biztosított a fellebbezések nyomán és esetleges párhuzamos eljárásokban (így tényleg csak a legbonyolultabb, de már alaposan minden oldalról megtárgyalt ügyek kerülnek a legfelsőbb fórum elé). Hiányzik az egészséges korrekciós lehetőség. Gyakran előfordul, hogy az EUB első-, másod-, harmadfokú és legfelsőbb fórumként egyszerre eljárva gyakorlatilag res iudicata helyzetet teremt mind 28 tagállamban. Ha hibás a döntése – s gyakran az – csak önkorrekció lehetséges, annak meg a „mundér becsülete” és az „intézményi büszkeség” akadálya. Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 1742

A jelenlegi döntéshozatali rendszer káros következményei (4) Az némi segítséget jelenthetne a hibás döntések elkerülésére, ha a nem specializált EUB bírák megfelelő szakértői támogatást kapnának. Azonban nem ez a helyzet. A szerzői jogi döntések némelyike azt mutatja, hogy az EUB-t riasztó információdeficit sújtja. Ez következik az előzetes döntéshozatali eljárás diszfunkcionális szabályozásából. Csak a felek, a tagállamok, az Európai Bizottság és egyes intézmények segíthetik a Bíróságot beadványokkal, no meg a főtanácsnokok (akik általában épp annyira szakértői az adott speciális jogterületnek, mint a bírák). Mindez azzal is jár, hogy a „politikai megfontolások” nagyobb súlyt kaphatnak mint a jogi érvek. Hiányzik egy olyan rendszer, mint az amici curiae beadványok lehetősége az USA-ban, amely módot ad minden érdekcsoportnak, hogy kellő alapossággal kifejtse jogi érveit. Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 1743

Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr EUB ITÉLETÁRADAT A NYILVÁNOSSÁGHOZ KÖZVETÍTÉS KÉRDÉSEIBEN (TOXIKUS TÖRMELÉKET GÖRGETVE)

Téves teóriák még a „jó” ítéletekben is – SGAE és az „új nyilvánosság” elmélet (1) SGAE: helyes magállapítás: A 2001/29 irányelv huszonharmadik preambulum-bekezdéséből következik, hogy a „nyilvánossághoz közvetítés” fogalmát szélesen kell értelmezni. Az ilyen értelmezés egyébiránt elengedhetetlen az irányelv alapvető céljának megvalósulásához, amely – ahogyan az annak kilencedik és tizedik preambulumbekezdéséből is következik – mások mellett a szerzők számára is olyan magas szintű oltalmat kíván teremteni, amely számukra megfelelő díjazást biztosít műveik felhasználása után, különösen a nyilvánossághoz közvetítés esetén. Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 1745

Téves teóriák még a „jó” ítéletekben is – SGAE és az „új nyilvánosság” elmélet (2) „Új nyilvánosság teória” a SGAE ítéletben (jobb angolul, mert a magyar fordítás zavaros): 40 It should also be pointed out that a communication made in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings constitutes, according to Article 11bis(1)(ii) of the Berne Convention, a communication made by a broadcasting organisation other than the original one. Thus, such a transmission is made to a public different from the public at which the original act of communication of the work is directed, that is, to a new public.  Brutális non sequitur következtetés. A Berni Egyezmény szövege és előkészítő munkálatai sehol nem utalnak „új nyilvánosságra”, mint feltételre. Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 1746

Téves teóriák még a „jó” ítéletekben is – SGAE és az „új nyilvánosság” elmélet (3) SGAE - új nyilvánosság elmélet, folytatás: 41 As is explained in the Guide to the Berne Convention, an interpretative document drawn up by the WIPO which, without being legally binding, nevertheless assists in interpreting that Convention, when the author authorises the broadcast of his work, he considers only direct users, that is, the owners of reception equipment who, either personally or within their own private or family circles, receive the programme. According to the Guide, if reception is for a larger audience, possibly for profit, a new section of the receiving public hears or sees the work and the communication of the programme via a loudspeaker or analogous instrument no longer constitutes simple reception of the programme itself but is an independent act through which the broadcast work is communicated to a new public. As the Guide makes clear, such public reception falls within the scope of the author’s exclusive authorisation right. Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 1747

Téves teóriák még a „jó” ítéletekben is – SGAE és az „új nyilvánosság” elmélet (4) SGAE - új nyilvánosság elmélet, folytatás: 42 The clientele of a hotel forms such a new public. The transmission of the broadcast work to that clientele using television sets is not just a technical means to ensure or improve reception of the original broadcast in the catchment area. On the contrary, the hotel is the organisation which intervenes, in full knowledge of the consequences of its action, to give access to the protected work to its customers. In the absence of that intervention, its customers, although physically within that area, would not, in principle, be able to enjoy the broadcast work.  A EUB nem a Berni Egyezményt értelmezi, hanem a régi 1978-as WIPO Guide-ot, s azt is félreérti. A Guide nem arról beszél, amire a Bíróság utal, s amikor a vezetékes továbbközvetítésről szól az akkori tipikus eseteket alapul véve beszél félreérthetően a sugárzott művek szélesebb („új”) nyilvánossághoz való hozzáférhetővé tételéről. Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 1748

Téves teóriák még a „jó” ítéletekben is – SGAE és az „új nyilvánosság” elmélet (5) Az 1978-as WIPO Guide elavult s akkor is egy a fejlődő országok számára írt, „könnyed” nyelvezetű, részletes elemzést nem tartalmazó kiadvány volt. Az EUB a WIPO-t, mint a szellemi tulajdonnal foglalkozó ENSz szakosított intézményt hiteles forrásnak ismerte el a Berni Egyezmény értelmezéséhez. A WIPO szerint azonban az Egyezménnyel ütközik a Bíróság által WIPO eredetűként felfogott értelmezés. Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 1749

Téves teóriák még a „jó” ítéletekben is – SGAE és az „új nyilvánosság” elmélet (6) 1993-ban a Berni Unió Végrehajtó Bizottságának Albizottsága Annotated Pinciples-t fogadott el, amelyet a Végrehajtó Bizottság decemberi ülése jóváhagyott. Ez nyilvánvalóvá tette, hogy a „service zone” elmélet elfogadhatatlan. Az Egyezmény 11bis Cikke (1) bekezdésének (ii) pontja alapján a szerzőknek kizárólagos joga van a vezetékes továbbközvetítésre, akkor is, ha az ugyanazon a területen történik, ahol a műveik sugárzás útján már hozzáférhetők. Az új 2003-as WIPO Guide ezt az álláspontot tükrözi. Minden rangosabb szerzői jogi kommentár is elutasítja az „új nyilvánosság” elméletet. Megemlítendő, hogy az „új nyilvánosság elmélet” gyakorlatilag a jogkimerülés elvének a nyilvánossághoz közvetítés jogára való kiterjesztését jelenti. Az „új nyilvánosság” elmélet eklatáns bizonyíték arra, hogy az előzetes döntéshozatali rendszerben programozva van: a nem specializált bírák gyakran tájékozatlanul döntenek. Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 1750

TVCatchup – az „új nyilvánosság” elmélet korrekciója egy másik téves elmélettel A TVCathup ítéletében helyesen döntött a Bíróság, hogy a sugárzott programok „streaming” útján való online továbbközvetítése engedély nélkül a nyilvánossághoz közvetítési jog sérelmével jár. A döntés nem lett volna lehetséges az „új nyilvánosság” elmélet alapján, miután a „streaming” ugyanazokat a programokat juttatta el a nyilvánossághoz az Egyesült Királyságban, amelyek sugárzás útján ugyanazon a területen (tehát ugyanannak a nyilvánosság számára) már hozzáférhető volt. Szerencsére az EUB bíráinak az alapvető jog- és igazságérzete nem engedte, hogy szabad felhasználást állapítsanak meg. A kiutat az „új technikai eszköz” („new technical means”) elmélet kidolgozásával találták meg, amely azonban ugyanúgy összeütközésben van a nemzetközi és uniós joggal, amely nem köti a nyilvánosság közvetítés jogát ilyen feltételhez. Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 1751

Swensson – újabb korrekciós kísérlet, de a „új nyilvánosság” marad (1) Az EUB helyesen állapította meg, hogy hyperlink használatával a nyilvánosság számára való (interaktív) hozzáférhetővé tétel valósul meg. Az „új nyilvánosság” elméletből az következett a Bíróság szerint, hogy miután az Internet egy nyilvánosságnak számít, nem valósulhat meg nyilvánossághoz közvetítés, illetve annak interaktív változata. Ezzel az alapvető megállapítással „megmentette az Internetet.” Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 1752

Swensson – újabb korrekciós kísérlet, de a „új nyilvánosság” marad (2) A szerzői jognak is adott azonban menedéket az EUB azzal, hogy „új nyilvánosság” meglétét állapította olyankor, amikor a jogosultak korlátozzák a hozzáférést valamilyen intézkedéssel (valószínűleg műszaki intézkedésre gondolt a Bíróság). Ha az intézkedést tágan lehet értelmezni, ez lehetőséget ad a jogosultaknak. Az „új nyilvánosság” elmélet azonban fennmaradt. Meg kellene szabadulni tőle. Kiút lehetne a biztonságos feltételekkel alkalmazott hallgatólagos jogosítás elismerése, olyankor, amikor a jogosultak szándéka nyilvánvaló? Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 1753

Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr DEL CORSO, A KATSZTRÓFA ÉS SZÉGYEN

Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr Az állatorvosi ló útban Del Corso-hoz, hogy az utolsó fogát is kihúzzák

Del Corso (1) List of problems: Referral with wrong questions to which, otherwise, if an undergradute student does not know the correct answer, he or she should fail: „Does the “broadcasting,” [sic!] free of charge, of phonograms within private dental practices engaged in professional economic activity, for the benefit of patients of those practices and enjoyed by them without any active choice on their part, constitute “communication to the public” or “making available to the public” for the purposes of the application of Article 3(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29?” (Since background music was involved, it is obvious that it cannot be characatrized either as „broadcasting” even if the source was broadcast music or „making available to the public. It is just communication to the public of already broadcast and recieved music.) The CJEU corrected the question concerning the making available right but it accepted and used the wrong charaterization „broadcasting” (at least in the English version of the ruling). See Articles 3(f) and 12 of the Rome Convention, Articles 2(f) and (g) and 15 of the WPPT and Article 8 of the Rental and Related Rights Directive: in the given case the right of „communication to the public” was involved and not its sister right – but different – right of broadcasting. Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 1756

Del Corso (2) List of problems: The CJEU review and modify the concept of „public” in the context of the concepts of „public performance” and „communication to the public” which is recognized in WIPO documents and in the European jurisprudence. Interestingly enough it does so due to double misrepresentation of the source (the definition in the WIPO Glossary). In paragraph 85, the following statement may be found: „As regards, to begin with, the ‘indeterminate’ nature of the public, the Court has observed that, according to the definition of the concept of ‘communication to the public’ given by the WIPO glossary, which, while not legally binding, none the less sheds light on the interpretation of the concept of public, it means ‘making a work … perceptible in any appropriate manner to persons in general, that is, not restricted to specific individuals belonging to a private group’. (continues) Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 1757

Del Corso (3) List of problems First major misrepresentation of the WIPO source: on the basis of the text quoted it is obvious that the Court has quoted an old out-of date WIPO Glossary published in 1980 („WIPO Glossary of Terms of the Law of Copyright and Neighboring Rights,” WIPO publication No. 816 (E/F/S). However, the Court has chosen a peculiar way of quoting the definition; namely it only quoted the first part of the definition consisting in the same sentence: ‘making a work … perceptible in any appropriate manner to persons in general, that is, not restricted to specific individuals belonging to a private group.” However, the sentence continues and the rest of the sentence reflects the more decisive – since more precisely identifiable – element of the concept of „public performance,” since it reads as follows: „and which exceeds the limits of usual domestic representation.” A dentist’s waiting room is obviously goes beyond „domestic representation.” Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 1758

Del Corso (4) List of problems In 2003, a new WIPO Glossary was published in the book entitled „Guide to the Copyright and Related Rights Treaties Administered by WIPO and Glossary of Copyright and Related Rights,” WIPO publication, in English No. 891(E), in French No. 891(F) and in Spanish No. 891(S). The reason for which a new Glossary became necessary was that, since 1980, a great number of new developments had taken place which had made previous publications, including the 1980 Glossary out of date not expressing the actual position of WIPO and its Member States. WIPO committees of governmental experts had also clarified the concept of „public.” The further clarified definition had maintained the key element left out in the quotation by the CJEU and, in fact, it had been built on it. Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 1759

Del Corso (5) List of problems The updated definition of „[the) public” which truely „sheds light” to the concept reads as follows: „Public; the ~ „1. ‚The public’ is a group consisting of a substantial number of persons outside the normal circle of a family and its closest social acquaintances. It is not decisive whether the group is actually gathered in one place; the availability of works or objects of related rights for the group suffices. In cases of communication to the public (including broadcasting), and (interactive) making available to the public, it is irrelevant whether the members of the public capable of receiving the works or objects of related rights may receive them at the same place or at difference places, and at the same time or at different times. „2. As an adjective in reference to an act, “public” (such as performance or recitation) means that the act is performed in the presence of the public, or at least at a place open to the public.” Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 1760

Del Corso (6) Nyilvánvaló „alkotmánysértések”:  a szubszidiaritás és arányosság elvének semmibe vétele;  beavatkozás olyankor, amikor a „belső piac” és „négy uniós szabadság” kívánalmai nyomokban sem léteznek. Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 1761

Del Corso (7) Brutálisan téves döntés olyan állítások alapján, amelyek miatt egy joghallgatót is arra kellene kérni a vizsgán, hogy próbálkozzon újra és közben tanulja meg legalább a szerzői jog ábécéjét: 97 … [I]t cannot be disputed that, in a situation such as that in the main proceedings, a dentist who broadcasts phonograms, by way of background music, in the presence of his patients cannot reasonably either expect a rise in the number of patients because of that broadcast alone or increase the price of the treatment he provides. Therefore, such a broadcast is not liable, in itself, to have an impact on the income of that dentist. Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 1762

Del Corso (8) 98 The patients of a dentist visit a dental practice with the sole objective of receiving treatment, as the broadcasting of phonograms is in no way a part of dental treatment. They have access to certain phonograms by chance and without any active choice on their part, according to the time of their arrival at the practice and the length of time they wait and the nature of the treatment they undergo. Accordingly, it cannot be presumed that the usual customers of a dentist are receptive as regards the broadcast in question. 99 Consequently such a broadcast is not of a profit-making nature, and thus does not fulfil the criterion set out in paragraph 90 of the present judgment. [Sic!!!] Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 1763

Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr ÖSSZEGZÉS

Összegzés; mit kellene tenni? (1) Mindenképp csökkenteni kellene az előzetes döntés iránti kérelmek számát; az EUB-nak szelektálnia kellene, mivel foglakozik. A Tagországok bíróságait ösztönözni kellene arra, hogy maguk döntsenek ne csak akkor, amikor a jogi helyzet teljesen egyértelmű, de akkor is, ha szerintük az adott kérdés bizonyos módon való eldöntését tartják helyesnek. Az alsóbb fokú bíróságokat arra kellene biztatni, hogy lehetőleg bízzák az ügy eldöntését az adott Tagország felsőbb szintű bíróságaira; ha az Európai Szerződést módosítanák valamiért, el kellene a törölni azt a lehetőséget, hogy az ilyen bíróságok is az EUB-hoz fordulhassanak. Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 1765

Összegzés; mit kellene tenni? (2) Az EUB-nak önmérsékletet kellene tanúsítania – s ha mégsem teszi, a Parlamentnek és a Tanácsnak rá kellene kényszerítenie erre – hogy elkerülje a konfliktusokat a hatalmi ágak megosztásának az elvével és a szubszidiaritás és arányosság elvével. Eljárásjogi garanciákra van szükség annak elkerülésére, hogy az EUB az adott speciális jogterületen való megfelelő tájékozódás nélkül döntsön. Lehetővé kellene tenni az USA rendszerében alkalmazott amici curiae típusú beadványokat. Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr. 1766

Id. Ficsor Mihály, MSzJF, ápr KÖSZÖNÖM A FIGYELMET