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A harmadik Öböl-háború 2003 március. Előzmények: embargó ENSZ BT 661. (1990. aug. 6.): kereskedelmi embargó, kivétel egyes élelmiszerek és gyógyszerek.

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Az előadások a következő témára: "A harmadik Öböl-háború 2003 március. Előzmények: embargó ENSZ BT 661. (1990. aug. 6.): kereskedelmi embargó, kivétel egyes élelmiszerek és gyógyszerek."— Előadás másolata:

1 A harmadik Öböl-háború 2003 március



4 Előzmények: embargó ENSZ BT 661. (1990. aug. 6.): kereskedelmi embargó, kivétel egyes élelmiszerek és gyógyszerek ENSZ BT 986. (1995. ápr. 14.): oil for food: meghatározott mennyiségű olaj exportja - cserében élelmiszerek és gyógyszerek embargó hatása: 1 millió halott, fele gyermek

5 CBS - 60 Minutes: Madeleine Albright (US ambassador to the UN) 1996, May 12th LESLEY STAHL: "...We have heard that a half a million children have died. I mean that's more children than died when-wh-in- in Hiroshima. And- and, you know, is the price worth it?" MADELEINE ALBRIGHT: "I think this is a very hard choice, but the price--we think the price is worth it... It is a moral question. but the moral question is even a larger one. Don't we owe to the American people and to the American military and to the other countries in the region that this man not be a threat?"

6 Madeleine Albright

7 STAHL: "Even with the starvation and the lack..." ALBRIGHT: "I think, Lesley--it is hard for me to say this because I am a humane person, but my first responsibility is to make sure that United States forces do not have to go and refight the Gulf War."


9 Madam Secretary “ I must have been crazy; I should have answered the question by reframing it and pointing out the inherent flaws in the premise behind it. Saddam Hussein could have prevented any child from suffering simply by meeting his obligations.... As soon as I had spoken, I wished for the power to freeze time and take back those words. My reply had been a terrible mistake, hasty, clumsy and wrong. Nothing matters more than the lives of innocent people. I had fallen into the trap and said something I simply did not mean. That was no one’s fault but my own.” (p. 275)

10 Repüléstilalmi övezetek 1991 április USA, Nagy-Britannia, Franciaország kurdok és síiták védelme iraki kormány katonai nyomás alatt Franciaország kilépett 1998 után rendszeres fegyveres támadások 1998 december: Bagdad bombázása


12 Amerikai motivációk

13 Deklaráltak Iraknak tömegpusztító fegyverei vannak - közvetlen fenyegetés (szomszédaira, USA-ra, világbékére) kapcsolat nemzetközi terrorista szervezetekkel ENSZ BT határozatok (16) megsértése emberi jogi okok: zsarnoki, brutális diktatúra demokratizálás láncreakció: “demokrácia- dominó” feltartóztatás nem alkalmazható (Szaddám pszichés jegyei)

14 Mögöttes okok neokonzervatívok befolyása evangelikalista vallási fundamentalizmus globális vezető szerepre törekvés –nemzetközi rendszert új alapokra (unilateralizmus) –példa statuálása amerikanizmus (érdekek és értékek) geostratégiai érdekek –olaj –Izrael biztonsága amerikai lakosság közhangulata következő választások terrorizmus elleni háború “szinten tartása” “apa-komplexus”

15 Tömegpusztító fegyverek már előző Öböl-háború idején is - fenyegetés szakértők ellentmondó véleményei fegyverzetellenőrök –UNSCOM (UN Special Commission - 1991 UNSCR 687) –UNMOVIC (UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission - 1999 UNSCR 1284) –Irak akadályozza –sokat leszerelnek és megsemmisítenek –Richard Butler 1998 december: semmi sem bizonyítható

16 Ellentmondások fegyverzetellenőrök 2002 november (1441) után nem találnak semmit Irak átad 10.000 oldalas dokumentációt Blix: nincs bizonyíték a megsemmisítésre - 29 pontos lista Amerikai és brit titkosszolgálatok: komoly WMD készletek Irakban Blair és Bush beszédei

17 Hans Blix előterjeszti beszámolóját 2003. március 7-én az ENSZ BT-ben

18 A Blix-jelentés “Iraq, with a highly developed administrative system, should be able to provide more documentary evidence about its proscribed weapons programs. Only a few new such documents have come to light so far and been handed over since we began inspections. …I hope that efforts in this respect, including the appointment of a governmental commission, will give significant results.”


20 6. As a result of the intelligence we judge that Iraq has: ● continued to produce chemical and biological agents; ● military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, including against its own Shia population. Some of these weapons are deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use them; ● command and control arrangements in place to use chemical and biological weapons. Authority ultimately resides with Saddam Hussein.

21 President Delivers "State of the Union" January 28, 2003

22 “The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa. Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high- strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production.”

23 U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the U.N. Security Council February 5, 2003














37 A Carnegie-jelentés


39 “Iraq’s WMD programs … did not, however, pose an immediate threat to the United States, the region, or global security.”

40 Elősegítette-e az USA Irak tömegpusztító fegyverkezési programját?

41 Donald H. Rumsfeld, United States Secretary of Defense, stated in testimony before the United States Senate Armed Services Committee on September 19, 2002 : "Certainly not to my knowledge. I have no knowledge of United States companies or government being involved in assisting Iraq develop, chemical, biological or nuclear weapons."

42 U.S. Chemical and Biological Warfare- Related Dual Use Exports to Iraq and their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Gulf War A Report of Chairman Donald W. Riegle, Jr. and Ranking Member Alfonse M. D'Amato of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs with Respect to Export Administration; United States Senate, 103d Congress, 2d Session May 25, 1994

43 "In October 1992, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, which has Senate oversight responsibility for the Export Administration Act (EAA), held an Inquiry into the U.S. export policy to Iraq prior to the Persian Gulf War. During that hearing it was learned that U.N. Inspectors identified many U.S.-manufactured items exported pursuant to licenses issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce that were used to further Iraq's chemical and nuclear weapons development and missile delivery system development programs."

44 "[T]he United States provided the government of Iraq with 'dual use' licensed materials which assisted in the development of Iraqi chemical, biological and missile-system programs...[Including] chemical warfare-agent precursors; chemical warfare-agent production-facility plans and technical drawings; chemical-warfare filling equipment; biological-warfare-related materials; missile- fabrication equipment and missile-system guidance equipment… [T]he same micro- organisms exported by the United States were identical to those the United Nations inspectors found and recovered from the Iraqi biological warfare program."

45 "U.N. inspectors identified many United States manufactured items that had been exported from the U.S. to Iraq under licenses issued by the Department of Commerce, and [established] that these items were used to further Iraq's chemical and nuclear weapons development and its missile delivery development programs…Between January 1985 and August 1990], the executive branch of our government approved 771 different export licenses for sale of dual-use technology to Iraq.”

46 Terrorizmus - az al-Káida-kapcsolat Bush tényként kezeli veszélyforrás - WMD terroristák kezébe juthat Szaddám és bin Láden inkább ellenfelek szakértők cáfolták Szándékozhatott volna-e Szaddám WMD-t átadni? - Nem


48 State of the Union January 28, 2003 “Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications, and statements by people now in custody reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of al Qaeda. Secretly, and without fingerprints, he could provide one of his hidden weapons to terrorists, or help them develop their own.”

49 President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 “We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back a decade... We've learned that Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb- making and poisons and deadly gases.”

50 George Bush's war ultimatum speech from the Cross Hall in the White House March 18, 2003 “The regime … has aided, trained and harbored terrorists, including operatives of al Qaeda.”


52 Was there reason to believe that Saddam Hussein would turn over unconventional weapons or WMD capability to Al Qaeda or other terrorists? The president presented this possibility as the ul- timate danger and the centerpiece of his case for war. … In fact, however, there was no positive evidence to support the claim that Iraq would have transferred WMD or agents to terrorist groups and much evidence to counter it.

53 Bin Laden and Saddam were known to detest and fear each other, the one for his radical religious beliefs and the other for his aggressively secular rule and persecution of Islamists. Bin Laden labeled the Iraqi ruler an infidel and an apostate, had offered to go to battle against him after the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and had frequently called for his overthrow. … The most intensive searching over the last two years has produced no solid evidence of a cooperative relationship between Saddam’s government and Al Qaeda.

54 Even without the particular relationship between Saddam and bin Laden, the notion that any government would turn over its principal security assets to people it could not control is highly dubious. States have multiple interests and land, people, and re- sources to protect. They have a future. Governments that made such a transfer would put themselves at the mercy of groups that have none of these. … All in all, governments would have little to gain and perhaps everything to lose by giving their WMD to terrorists.

55 A kőolaj


57 Iraki olajkészletek második legnagyobb bizonyított készlet 2002: 112.5 md hordó becslés: a legnagyobb készletek: 200-400 md hordó alacsony kitermelési költségek –Irak: 1-1.5$ –Malajzia, Omán: 5$ –Mexikó, Oroszország: 6-8$ –Északi-tenger: 12-16$ –USA: 20$ fölött

58 USA érdekeltsége Cheney-report 2001: nemzeti energiapolitika –növekvő olajimport-függőség: 50%-ról 2020-ra kétharmadra –“recommends that the President make energy security a priority of our trade and foreign policy” Ha Szaddám marad, TotalElfFina (Fr.), China National Oil Co és Lukoil (Orosz) Szaudi-USA szövetség átértékelődése –szeptember 11. –emberi jogi szempontok –Irak “kiválthatja” Szaúd-Arábiát

59 USA érdekeltsége Öböl olajához való akadálytalan hozzájutás amerikai vezető szerep biztosítása

60 Jimmy Carter State of the Union Address January 23, 1980 Three basic developments have helped to shape our challenges: the steady growth and increased projection of Soviet military power beyond its own borders; the overwhelming dependence of the Western democracies on oil supplies from the Middle East; and the press of social and religious and economic and political change in the many nations of the developing world, exemplified by the revolution in Iran… Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

61 Warren Christopher külügyminiszter, 1995 “For more than four decades, administrations of both parties have understood America’s vital interests in the Middle East: Arab-Israeli peace, Israel’s security, and unimpeded access to Persian Gulf oil.”

62 The Middle East Summary of US National Interests at Stake

63 Vital That Israel survive as a free state. That there be no major sustained curtailment in energy supplies to the world. That no state in the region hostile to the United States acquire new or additional weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities.

64 Walter Russell Mead Council on Foreign Relations "We do not get that large a percentage of our oil from the Middle East. Japan gets a lot more... And one of the reasons that we are sort of assuming this role of policeman of the Middle East, more or less, has more to do with making Japan and some other countries feel that their oil flow is assured... so that they don't then feel more need to create a great power, armed forces, and security doctrine, and you don't start getting a lot of great powers with conflicting interests sending their militaries all over the world."

65 A neokonzervatívok

66 A “keresztapa”: Irving Kristol patriotizmus bármiféle “világkormány” elutasítása “gyanakvás” a nemzetközi intézményekkel szemben különbségtétel barátok és ellenségek között a “nemzeti érdek” túlterjed az országhatárokon és ideológiai töltetű

67 Amerikai hegemónia fenntartása és kiterjesztése

68 Defense Planning Guidance 1992 (Paul Wolfowitz) preventing the emergence of a rival superpower to safeguard U.S. interests and promote American values If necessary, the United States must be prepared to take unilateral action

69 "Our first objective is to prevent the re- emergence of a new rival. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia.

70 "There are three additional aspects to this objective: First the U.S must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. Second, in the non- defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role."

71 Think tank-ek American Enterprise Institute Heritage Foundation Cato Institute Project for the New American Century Americans for Victory over Terrorism Foundation for the Defense of Democracies National Endowment for Democracy Committee for the Liberation of Iraq Committee on the Present Danger (III) The Weekly Standard

72 The Committee on the Present Danger is dedicated to protecting and expanding democracy by winning the global war against terrorism and the movements and ideologies that drive it. We will support policies that use appropriate means--military, economic, political, social--to achieve this goal.

73 Project for the New American Century William Kristol Robert Kagan

74 Statement of Principles June 3, 1997 ・ we need to increase defense spending significantly if we are to carry out our global responsibilities today and modernize our armed forces for the future; ・ we need to strengthen our ties to democratic allies and to challenge regimes hostile to our interests and values; ・ we need to promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad; ・ we need to accept responsibility for America's unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles.

75 Elliott Abrams Gary Bauer William J. Bennett Jeb Bush Dick Cheney Eliot A. Cohen Midge Decter Paula Dobriansky Steve Forbes Aaron Friedberg Francis Fukuyama Frank Gaffney Fred C. Ikle Donald Kagan Zalmay Khalilzad I. Lewis Libby Norman Podhoretz Dan Quayle Peter W. Rodman Stephen P. Rosen Henry S. Rowen Donald Rumsfeld Vin Weber George Weigel Paul Wolfowitz

76 Open Letter to the President February 19, 1998 “Many of us were involved in organizing the Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf in 1990 to support President Bush's policy of expelling Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. Seven years later, Saddam Hussein is still in power in Baghdad. …Only a determined program to change the regime in Baghdad will bring the Iraqi crisis to a satisfactory conclusion.”

77 Stephen Solarz Richard Perle Elliot Abrams Richard V. Allen Richard Armitage Jeffrey T. Bergner John Bolton Stephen Bryen Richard Burt Frank Carlucci Judge William Clark Paula J. Dobriansky Doug Feith Frank Gaffney Jeffrey Gedmin Fred C. Ikle Robert Kagan Zalmay M. Khalilzad Sven F. Kraemer William Kristol Michael Ledeen Bernard Lewis Admiral Frederick L. Lewis Maj. Gen. Jarvis Lynch Robert C. McFarlane Joshua Muravchik Robert A. Pastor Martin Peretz Roger Robinson Peter Rodman Peter Rosenblatt Donald Rumsfeld Gary Schmitt Max Singer Helmut Sonnenfeldt Caspar Weinberger Leon Wienseltier Paul Wolfowitz David Wurmser Dov S. Zakheim


79 “..the administration’s fondness for multilateralism.. Clinton over the years has repeatedly referred to the United Nations.. This may be canny domestic politics, but it is profoundly bad foreign policy… This array of problems is not happy news for those who saw the need for stronger, decisive action against Saddam Hussein.”


81 Neokonok sürgetése Irak megtámadására Clinton idején nyílt levelek sora szeptember 11. után Wolfowitz - Powell ellenzi Irak csak kezdet: rendszerváltás-sorozat a Közel- Keleten (“demokrácia-dominó”) Bush: szeptember 11. után utasítás Irak elleni hadműveletek kidolgozása november 21., 26.: Bush-beszédek: terrorista fenyegetések megszüntetése 2002 január: Irak: “axis of evil” 2002 április Bush: “Szaddámnak mennie kell”

82 Paul Wolfowitz

83 Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview with Sam Tannenhaus, Vanity Fair (May 9, 2003) "For bureaucratic reasons we settled on one issue, weapons of mass destruction, because it was the one reason everyone could agree on." "The truth is that for reasons that have a lot to do with the U.S. government bureaucracy, we settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on which was weapons of mass destruction as the core reason,"

84 A “Bush-doktrina” “Nem teszünk különbséget azok között, akik kitervelték ezeket az akciókat, és azok között, akik menedéket nyújtottak nekik.” (Bush, 2001. szeptember 11.)

85 Fő elemek Aktív amerikai globális vezető szerep Rendszerváltás a “gonosz tengelye” országaiban Demokrácia támogatása Megelőző csapásmérés Katonai erő, amerikai értékek

86 President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point June 1, 2002

87 We will defend the peace against threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent. Some worry that it is somehow undiplomatic or impolite to speak the language of right and wrong. I disagree. … We are in a conflict between good and evil, and America will call evil by its name. By confronting evil and lawless regimes, we do not create a problem, we reveal a problem. And we will lead the world in opposing it.

88 But new threats also require new thinking. Deterrence -- the promise of massive retaliation against nations -- means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies…. Yet the war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act.

89 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America V. Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction

90 But new deadly challenges have emerged from rogue states and terrorists…. We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends…. We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries. …The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.

91 “Lator államok” “pária”, “haramia”, “lator” államok, “törvényen kívüli rezsimek” fenyegetés a nemzetközi rendszer felé elrettentés és egyéb diplomáciai eszközök nem alkalmazhatók állandóan változó lista “axis of evil”: Irak, Irán, Észak-Korea USA és Izrael?

92 The President's State of the Union Address January 29, 2002 North Korea …Iran…Iraq..States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.

93 Az Izrael-lobbi és Izrael biztonsága

94 Izrael támogatása amerikai nemzeti érdek Izrael-lobbi –neokonzervatívok –protestáns fundamentalizmus, –“keresztény cionizmus” Holocaust Izrael állam teljesítményének elismerése - demokrácia

95 Amerikai segélyek Izraelnek legnagyobb felvevő összesen több mint 140 milliárd $ évente 3 milliárd $ minden izraelire évente 500 $

96 Diplomáciai támogatás 1982 óta 32 ENSZ BT határozat megvétózása (több, mint az összes többi BT-tag együttes vétója) arab törekvések blokkolása izraeli nukleáris arzenál NAEÜ általi vizsgálatát illetően Izrael támogatása a béketárgyalásokon

97 Izrael-lobbi amerikai zsidóság: 5.5-6 millió fő “Amerika izraelizációja” vallási konfliktusok Izraellel American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs (American Israel PAC): második legbefolyásosabb lobbicsoport hatékony lobbizás zsidó szavazók többsége demokrata jelöltre (Clinton: 78%, Gore: 79%)

98 Our Current Agenda Isolating the Hamas-Led Palestinian Government Stopping Iran From Acquiring Nuclear Weapons Standing By Israel to Ensure the Security of the Only Democracy in the Middle East Defending Israel Against Tomorrow's Threats Preparing the Next Generation of Pro-Israel Leaders

99 A Clean Break:A New Strategy for Securing the Realm Report prepared by The Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies’ "Study Group on a New Israeli Strategy Toward 2000”. Richard Perle, James Colbert, Charles Fairbanks, Jr., Douglas Feith, Robert Loewenberg, David Wurmser, and Meyrav Wurmser, 1996

100 new perspective on peace and security: … "peace through strength” Israel can shape its strategic environment…This effort can focus on removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq - an important Israeli strategic objective in its own right. Israel can make a clean break from the past and establish a new vision for the U.S.-Israeli partnership... Israel’s new strategy - based on a shared philosophy of peace through strength - reflects continuity with Western values.

101 Keresztény cionizmus az amerikai Izrael-lobbi legjelentősebb ereje keresztény jobboldal és cionizmus összefonódása: Reagan idején protestáns fundamentalizmus vallási közeledése a zsidósághoz

102 Vallási közös pontok Jézus második eljövetele helyszín: Izrael földje első lépés: Izrael népének újbóli létrejötte a bibliai földön a zsidók Isten kiválasztott népe Izrael állam védelme zsidó településpolitika is az isteni terv része


104 ICEJ 1980 40 ország keresztényei saját “követség” Jeruzsálemben “Cion modern kori helyreállítása nem történelmi véletlen, hanem Isten szavának megvalósulása”

105 National Unity Coalition for Israel 1991 200 keresztény és zsidó szervezet cél: “erős és biztonságos Izrael” lobbi- és propaganda-tevékenység “ne legyen a terrorizmus jutalma egy palesztin állam létesítése”

106 Christians United for Israel

107 “Keresztény cionizmus” paradoxona cionizmus szekularizált, nacionalista ideológia nem vallási, hanem etnikai terminusok vallásos zsidóság egy része (ultraortodoxok) anticionista egyes keresztények jobban rokonszenveznek a cionizmussal, mint egyes zsidók




111 Interpretációk összecsapása Irak elleni támadás nemzetközi jogi szempontból igazolható-e? USA, brit legfelsőbb ügyész, nemzetközi jogászok kisebbsége: igen nemzetközi közösség és nemzetközi jogászok többsége: nem

112 USA álláspont 1441. sz. ENSZ BT határozat erre sem volt szükség, mert 678. sz. és 687. sz. ENSZ BT határozatok egyáltalán nem kellett ENSZ BT felhatalmazás, mert –közvetlen fenyegetettség miatt jogos önvédelem (ENSZ Alapokmány) –“The United Nations Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities, so we will rise to ours” (George W. Bush)

113 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 8 November 2002 Irak nem teljesítette 687. sz. határozat előírásait tűzszünet csak ezzel a feltétellel utolsó esélyt ad Iraknak kötelezettségei folyamatos megszegése esetén “súlyos következmények”

114 Decides,… to afford Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the council Recalls, in that context, that the council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations;

115 RESOLUTION 678 (1990) Authorizes Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the above- mentioned resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area;

116 RESOLUTION 687 (1991) Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of: All chemical and biological weapons … All ballistic missiles … The forming of a Special Commission, which shall carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities, Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons … Declares that, upon official notification by Iraq to the Secretary-General and to the Security Council of its acceptance of the provisions above, a formal cease-fire is effective

117 Lord Goldsmith 678., 687. és 1441. sz. határozatok - összefüggő egység erő alkalmazása nemzetközi béke és biztonság helyreállítása érdekében 678.: erő alkalmazása 687.: újabb kötelezettségek, tűzszünet csak felfüggesztette 678-ast 687. megsértése: ismét 678. érvényes 1441.: Irak megsértette 687-est, de “utolsó lehetőség” - ezt is megszegte - érvényes 678-as

118 Nem volt ENSZ felhatalmazás erő: csakis “use all necessary means” - 1441-es nem így fogalmaz (nem fogadták volna el egyhangúan) 687-es már “felülírta” 678-ast, erő nem a tűzszünet kikényszerítésére a BT határozatokban foglaltak kikényszerítése a testület feladata egy határozat megszegését csak a BT állapíthatja meg és dönthet a következő lépésről 1998. dec. 16-i ülés: éles vita amerikai-brit bombázásokról


120 Neo Culpa by david rose november 3, 2006 As Iraq slips further into chaos, the war's neoconservative boosters have turned sharply on the Bush administration, charging that their grand designs have been undermined by White House incompetence. In a series of exclusive interviews, Richard Perle, Kenneth Adelman, David Frum, and others play the blame game with shocking frankness. Target No. 1: the president himself.

121 Richard Perle Chairman of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee

122 "I think if I had been delphic, and had seen where we are today, and people had said, 'Should we go into Iraq?,' I think now I probably would have said, 'No, let's consider other strategies for dealing with the thing that concerns us most, which is Saddam supplying weapons of mass destruction to terrorists.’…Could we have managed that threat by means other than a direct military intervention? Well, maybe we could have."

123 Kenneth Adelman Defence Policy Board member

124 “Operation Cakewalk” 1 The Washington Post, February 13, 2002 “I believe demolishing Hussein's military power and liberating Iraq would be a cakewalk. Let me give simple, responsible reasons: (1) It was a cakewalk last time; (2) they've become much weaker; (3) we've become much stronger; and (4) now we're playing for keeps.”

125 “Operation Cakewalk” 2 Vanity Fair, November 3, 2006 "I just presumed that what I considered to be the most competent national- security team since Truman was indeed going to be competent. They turned out to be among the most incompetent teams in the post-war era. Not only did each of them, individually, have enormous flaws, but together they were deadly, dysfunctional."

126 David Frum George W. Bush szövegírója

127 David Frum "I always believed as a speechwriter that if you could persuade the president to commit himself to certain words, he would feel himself committed to the ideas that underlay those words. And the big shock to me has been that although the president said the words, he just did not absorb the ideas. And that is the root of, maybe, everything."

128 A Vanity Fair illusztrációi Neo Culpa 2006. november 3.





133 És végül …

134 2006. november 5. Saddam Hussein has been found guilty of crimes against humanity and sentenced to death by an Iraqi court for his part in the killing of 148 Shia Muslims in Dujail in 1982.



137 A törzsi rendszer Lakosság 3/4-e 150 törzs, 2000 klán Család (khamsz) [ház - bajt], nagycsalád (hamula), klán (fakhd), törzs (asíra), konföderáció (kabila) Arábiából bevándorolt törzsek (18- - szunnita vahhábizmus Áttérés síita iszlámra

138 Az iraki törzsek

139 Az iszlám Irakban Sokáig “ütközőzóna” oszmánok és szafávidák között - szunnita-síita rivalizálás síita iszlám hierarchikus rendszere dél-iraki törzsek tömeges áttérése

140 A mardzsaíjja akhbári-uszúli ellentét - uszúli győzelem Akhbári: korábbi síita imámok autoritása Uszúli: idzstihád Mudzstahid - mukallid Molla - ajatollah Csúcson: ájatulláh al-uzmá - mardzsa-i- taklíd, “az imitáció forrása”

141 Mardzsia Intellektuális kapacitás Ideális esetben csak egy, általában több Család tekintélye Szociális kapcsolatrendszer Khumsz fele vagy egésze Hálózat világszerte Hawza: tradicionális síita iszlám-tanulmányok szemináriuma –Nedzsef: –Fő vetélytársa Kum –Kerbela, Meshed, Iszfahán

142 Nedzsef

143 Ali imám




147 Kerbela

148 Huszein - Abbász imámok







155 Síiták differenciáltsága Világiak - vallásosak Vallási kérdések eltérő értelmezése –Mardzsaíjja jellege Aktív vagy passzív (kvietista) Egyfajta vagy kétfajta (ti. vallási és politikai) Dinasztiák, családok –Iraki nacionalisták (arabok) –Irániak

156 Szadr család Bákir asz-Szadr, Daava vezetője –Vallási + politikai vezetés –1980-ban meggyilkolják 1992: Szádik asz-Szadr (Szadr II) - unokatestvére –Aktivista, “elkötelezett” mardzsaíjja –1999-ben két fiával együtt megölik –Harmadik, Muktada asz-Szadr megmenekül Szadrista mozgalom

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